We argue that the invertibility of a block cipher can reduce the security of schemes that use it, and a better starting point for scheme design is the non-invertible analog of a block cipher, that is, a pseudorandom function PRF. Since a block cipher may be viewed as a pseudorandom permutation, we are led to investigate the reverse of the problem studied by Luby and Racko , and ask: how can one transform a PRP into a PRF in as security-preserving a way as possible?" The solution we propose is data-dependent re-keying. As an illustrative special case, let E : f0; 1g n f 0 ; 1 g n ! f 0 ; 1 g n be the block cipher. Then we can construct the PRF F from the PRP E by setting F k;x = E E k ;x ; x . We generalize this to allow for arbitrary block and key lengths, and to improve e ciency. We prove strong quantitative bounds on the value of data-dependent re-keying in the Shannon model of an ideal cipher, and take some initial steps towards an analysis in the standard model.
Introduction
This paper describes a transformation | turning a pseudorandom permutation" PRP into a pseudorandom function" PRF using data-dependent re-keying." It can beapplied to a block cipher to increase the block cipher's security in certain ways, and, in particular, the method leads to block cipher based message encryption and authentication techniques which are approximately as e cient as ones in current use, but have better security.
In Section 2 we explain our at rst paradoxical sounding thesis: that invertibility o f a block cipher can be a liability, not an asset, when it comes to the security o f s c hemes that use the cipher. We will then explain what are PRFs and PRPs, how the former are a better starting point for constructions but the latter a better model for block ciphers, and how all this leads us to consider the problem of transforming PRPs into PRFs in a security-preserving way.
In Section 3 we describe our way to do the PRP to PRF transformation. We call our transform The interpretation of the above is that the Fn d transform gives good security against generic" attacks. To guage its strength against cryptanalytic attacks we also analyze it in the standard complexity theoretic or reductionist" framework. We do succeed in providing a reduction, but the quality of the bounds is not as goodas in the Shannon model, and thus we view these results as preliminary, hopefully to be improved.
The results are presented, discussed, and displayed graphically in Section 5. Just before that, in Section 4, we provide the precise de nitions of the security notions, but these can be skipped at rst reading, or skipped entirely by an expert. The rest of the paper is devoted to proofs.
The Problem
We begin with a simple example, then relate these issues to PRFs and PRPs, then describe the problem that results, and conclude with a discussion of related work.
Invertibility can hurt when using block ciphers: An example
A block cipher is a function E: f0; 1g f 0 ; 1 g n ! f 0 ; 1 g n which transforms an n-bit message block
x into an n-bit string y under the control of a -bit key k: y = Ek;x. The function is invertible in the sense that for each k ey the map E k def = Ek; is a permutation of f0; 1g n , and knowledge of k permits computation of E ,1 k . Concrete examples are DES, triple-DES and RC5. Message encryption is done by using the block cipher in some mode of operation, such as CBC." Using eve n a v ery good" block cipher say triple-DES, or even an ideal cipher, CBC encryption becomes insecure once 2 n=2 blocks have been encrypted, in the sense that at this point partial information about the message begins to leak 2 , due to birthday attacks. 3 Furthermore, this is true 1 All analyses in this paper are concrete and quantitative, meaning providing explicit, non-asymptotic bounds on the success probabiilty o f a n a d v ersary as a function of its resources. 2 A good encryption scheme is much more than one that prevents key recovery from a ciphertext: it should have the property that even partial information about the plaintext is not revealed 9, 4 . 3 The attacks are well known. See 4 for an analysis of their e ectiveness relative to formal notions of security for many other common modes of operation, too. Thus direct use of a 64-bit block size block cipher usually enables one to safely encrypt no more than 2 32 blocks, which is quite small.
We stress that these attacks arise because the cipher is a permutation, and their cost depends only on the block length, not the key length or the security of the block cipher. So the attacks are just as e ective for triple-DES, or even an ideal block cipher, as they are for DES. In summary, block cipher based schemes are often subject to birthday attacks arising from the very nature of block ciphers as permutations.
So how can we safely encrypt more than 2 n=2 blocks? One answer is to use a slightly di erent type of primitive in an appropriate mode of operation: speci cally, a pseudorandom function" PRF in CTR counter mode, as discussed in 4, 11 and explained further below. This way to encrypt is easy and has no extra overhead if a PRF of cost comparable to the block cipher is available.
The above is only one example of an issue that arises in many places: that the permutivity o f a block cipher can hinder the security o f s c hemes which use it. To e ectively address this we need to explain what are PRFs and PRPs and how they relate to block ciphers.
PRPs, PRFs, and their relation to block ciphers
Let us rst back up and look at how the security of a block cipher is best captured. Security of a block cipher: PRPs. It is natural to view a real block cipher as constructed to approximate", as closely as possible, an ideal block cipher that is, a random permutation in the sense that if you don't know the key k and only see input output examples of E k then these should appear like input output examples of a random permutation. The quality o f a g i v en block cipher E as a PRP pseudorandom permutation is thus captured by a function Sec prp E q;t which returns the maximum advantage" that one can obtain in distinguishing E k from a random permutation if you see q input output examples and are allowed further computational resources bounded by t. In the complexity-theoretic model, t will bound computing time; in the information-theoretic model, t will bound the number of known k; x; E k x values. The advantage is a numberbetween 0 and 1 given as the di erence of two probabilities: the probability that the adversary outputs 1 given a random function E k from E, and the probability that the adversary outputs 1 given a random permutation . See Section 4 for more details.
Each speci c cipher eg. DES will have such an associated security function, which depends on and to a large extent comprises its cryptanalytic strength. Of course we w on't know for sure what is this function, but we can work with what we know from cryptanalytic results. For example, if the linear cryptanalysis of 13 is the best attack on DES, we might assume Sec prp DES q;t stays small close to 0 until q;treaches around 2 43 . From now on, block cipher" and PRP" are synonymous, from the security point of view. Ciphers without invertibility: PRFs. Like a block cipher, a pseudorandom function PRF is a map F: f0; 1g f 0 ; 1 g n ! f 0 ; 1 g n , but now F k def = Fk; is not required to be invertible. The required security property is to approximate, as closely as possible, a random function. The quality of a given function F is captured by Sec prf F q;t which returns the maximum advantage" that one can obtain in distinguishing F k from a random function if you see q input-output examples and are allowed computational resources t. This advantage is the di erence between probability that the adversary outputs 1 given a random function F k from F and the probability that the adversary outputs 1 given a random function . See Section 4 for more details.
for encryption.
The example revisited. Counter mode encryption with a PRF F means that to encrypt an m-block plaintext M = x 1 x m , send ctr; F k hctr + 1ix 1 k k F k h ctr + mix m where hii is the binary encoding of i into n bits, k " denotes concatenation, and where you increment ctr by m after doing each encryption. Notice that to decrypt you need only apply F k , so that you don't need this function to be invertible. Counter-mode encryption with a good PRF is pretty m uch ideal encryption": it is shown in 4 that an adversary's chance of obtaining partial information about some plaintext, after q blocks have been encrypted, is at most Sec prf F q;t, the strength of F as a PRF. In particular if we had a PRF F with the same numerical security as DES but as a PRF not a PRP, namely Sec prf F q;tSec prp DES q;t, then we could encrypt nearly 2 43 blocks, well above the birthday bound.
In contrast, when we use a block cipher PRP directly in CBC or CTR mode, we are not able to recoup all of the cryptographic strength captured by its Sec prp E ; value, because at q = 2 n=2 which i s q = 2 32 for DES birthday attacks kill the encryption scheme. 
Luby-Racko backwards
The above is part of an emerging view or understanding, emanating from works like 4 , 5, 6, 20 , that when it comes to designing higher-level primitives like encryption schemes or MACs a PRF is a better tool than a PRP, from two points of view: it permits easier and more e ective analysis of the designed scheme, and the resulting schemes have a greater proven quantitative security. This leads us to suggest that for the purpose of protocol design, what we really want are PRFs, not block ciphers PRPs. So the question is how to get PRF families of high security and low cost. One possibility i s t o make these directly, in the same way we make block ciphers now. We suggest that this indeed be kept in mind for the future, but at the moment i s n o t a v ery pragmatic view, for two reasons. First, we h a v e lots of good block ciphers available, and we w ant to use them well. Second, permutivity may be important to the design process of block ciphers; for example, using the round structure of a F eistel-network gives rise to a permutation. 4 We propose instead to transform PRPs into PRFs. That is, starting with a good PRP E realized by a block cipher, convert it into a goodPRF F. This is e ectively the reverse of the problem considered by Luby and Racko 12 , who wanted to turn PRFs into PRPs.
A crucial issue is to make transformations that are as security preserving" as possible. We w ant Sec prf F q;t to remain low e v en for q 2 n=2 . Ideally, Sec prf F q;t w ould be close to Sec prp E q;t. Let us now discuss some related work. Following that we present our construction. 4 Another possibility i s t o m a k e sure that the block size n is large enough n 128 that attacks of complexity 2 n=2 are irrelevant. This too is a good idea, but the construction we give has merit which g o e s b e y ond the birthday attacks which w e h a v e been using to motivate this problem.
History and related work
Our construction is related to the cascade construction of 3 .
The notion of a PRF was rst de ned in the polynomial-time framework by Goldreich, Goldwasser and Micali 8 . A concrete security treatment of PRFs, together with the idea that concretely de ned PRFs PRPs can be used to model block ciphers, originates with 6 . Luby and Racko use the term PRP to refer to a family of permutations that is a PRF family in the sense of 8 . Our notion is di erent in that we measure the advantage relative to random permutations, not functions. This makes no di erence in the polynomial-time framework, but in the concrete-security framework the di erence is crucial; indeed, if concrete security is ignored, the problem we are considering does not exist.
The ideal block cipher model we use for some of our results is that of 19 , used also in 7, 10 .
There are many natural ways to try to do the PRP-to-PRF conversion. One of the rst to come to mind is to de ne F k x = x E k x . This construction is of value in some contexts, but not in ours. For if you are given an oracle for this F k you e ectively have an oracle for E k : for any query x you can compute E k x a s x F k x . So F k will resemble a random function no more than E k does. There are many natural alternatives to the Fn d transformation. For example, truncate E k x, de ning F k x to be some appropriate-length pre x of E k x. This scheme was partially analyzed by 2 . Another natural method is F k 1 k 2 x = E k 1 x E k 2 x . This has not been analyzed.
Aiello and Venkatesan 1 give a general construction for turning a PRF E : f0; 1g f 0 ; 1 g n ! f 0 ; 1 g n into a PRF F : f0; 1g 6 f 0 ; 1 g 2 n ! f 0 ; 1 g 2 n . But this is a di erent problem. Although they too want to circumvent some birthday attacks, their starting point is a random function not a permutation and the problem is to double the numberof bits the function can take as input. They are bound by the original security of the starting function as a PRF: birthday attacks are only prevented in the sense that the construction does not induce such attacks itself. So if a block cipher is the starting point, it is viewed as a PRF, meaning the security is only 2 n=2 . There is no notion of modeling a cipher as a random permutation. In contrast, we go above the original birthday threshold, to a security close to 2 n . Our construction is also more e cient, and it yields a map of the same key size and block length as the original one.
In constructing a Wegman-Carter message authentication code MAC 21 one needs to symmetrically encrypt the universal-hash of each message M. If a PRP is in hand for doing the encryption, one could de ne MAC k1;k2 M = ctr; E k2 ctrh k1 M, but the security w ould degrade by q 2 2 ,n compared to using a PRF. Here q is the numberofMACed messages. scribes an alternative with better exact security. Our methods allow the simpler and more general ctr; F k2 ctrh k1 M, where F is the result of PRP-to-PRF conversion starting from E.
As we explained, Luby and Racko consider the complementary problem of turning a PRF into a block cipher 12 . Luby and Racko spawned much further work, including 14, 15, 16, 17, 22 , and our work shares their emphasis on concrete bounds, e ciency, and tight reductions. 3 The Fn Construction
We have described in Section 2.4 some simple suggestions that don't work and some related constructions. Now w e present our solution. We let E: f0; 1g f 0 ; 1 g n ! f 0 ; 1 g n be the given block cipher PRP.
The values n and vary across real block ciphers; for example, for DES we have = 5 6 and n = 64; for two-key triple DES we h a v e = 112 and n = 64. We w ant to handle all these cases. Accordingly, our construction depends on the relative values of and n. It also depends on a parameter d, where 0 d n .
Simple Case. The simplest case of our construction is when the given PRP has the property that = n, and we choose d = 0. One then de nes F = Fn 0 E by Fk;x=EEk;x; x . That is, F k x = E k 0 x , where k 0 = E k x. We call this data-dependent re-keying" since we are applying E to x, but using the data-dependent derived key" k 0 = E k x. The cost of computing F is twice the cost of computing E, in the sense that there are two applications of E for each application of F. The general construction includes a provision aimed at reducing this overhead. We only need bits of derived key y Ek;x
Use derived key on the input return y end
We call x 0 the group selector and k the derived key. The j applications of E k i are to deal with the possibility that n , and the truncating of k 0 to bits is to handle the possibility that the key length might n o t b e a m ultiple of the block length n. More strange is the discarding of bits from the x, namely the x d. This is for e ciency, as we will explain below. As an example, if E = DES, so that = 5 6 and n = 64, we w ould have j = 1 , so the key of F is just a 56-bit DES key k 1 , the derived key k 0 is the rst 56 bits of DES k 1 x 0 , and the output is DES k 0x. If E is TDES two-key triple-DES, so that = 112 and n = 64, we w ould have j = 2, so the key for F is a pair k 1 k 2 of TDES keys, the derived key k 0 is the rst 112 bits of TDES k 1 x 0 TDES k 2 x 0 , and the output is TDES k 0x.
Notice that for xed k 1 k j , i f t w o n -bit strings determine the same group selector then they generate the same derived key, and this happens if the two strings agree in the rst n , d bits. Accordingly, we cluster together all points that have the same group selector into what we call a common key group. Thus there are a total of 2 n,d common key groups. For any 2 f 0 ; 1 g n , d w e de ne ckg = fx : x 1:::n,d = g as the -th common key group. Identifying strings with integers in the natural way, the i-th common key group consists of the integers i , 12 d ; :::; i2 d , 1. Efficiency. Recall that the nominal way to encrypt using F = Fn d E involves applying F to a single key k and successive ctr-values. By dropping the least signi cant d bits of this counter, one needs to recompute k 0 only once every 2 d invocations of F. Of course an implementation would need to to record the last derived key and refrain from re-computing it. Doing this makes the amortized cost to compute F just 1 + j2 ,d times the cost of computing E. For many ciphers this is an underestimate because of additional cost associated to changing the key. In fact, the cost of changing the key for some block ciphers is high, which i s w h y w e don't want t o d o i t v ery often.
Variations. How exactly one drops bits of x is not so important. For example, instead of shifting to the right one could zero-out the least signi cant d bits. This makes no di erence in the analysis.
We have constructed F = Fn d E to beamap F : f0; 1g j f 0 ; 1 g n ! f 0 ; 1 g n . If one prefers, let F k x = E k 0 x where k 0 is the rst bits of E k 1 x d k k E k j x d and k i is de ned as E k hii. Now F uses a -bit key, just like F. The analysis of F lifts to F with just a tiny loss in quantitative security.
De nitions
Here we give the more precise de nitions of security in the two models in which w e will be analyzing our construction, namely the standard complexity theoretic" model and the Shannon model.
Recall that in Section 2 we discussed the security o f F and E by w a y of functions Sec prf F q;t and Sec prp E q;t. Their meaning changes according to the model in a simple way: In the complexity theoretic model they are CSec prf F q;t and CSec prp E q;t, respectively, these quantities being de ned in Section 4.1 below, and In the ideal cipher model, they are ISec prf F q;t and ISec prp ;n q;t, respectively, these quantities being de ned in Section 4.2 below, where F refers to the transformation that takes E into F.
In our case, F = Fn d .
Preliminaries. If S is a probability space then g S denotes the operation of selecting g at random according to the distribution speci ed by S. If S is a set it is viewed as endowed with the uniform distribution, so that g S means that g is selected uniformly at random from set S. If y is not a set then g y is a simple assignment statement, assigning g the value y. It is thus equivalent t o g f y g . Let Perm n denote the set of all permutations : f0; 1g n ! f 0 ; 1 g n . Let Rand n denote the set of all functions : f0; 1g n ! f 0 ; 1 g n . Let BC ;n bethe set of all maps E : f0; 1g f 0 ; 1 g n ! f 0 ; 1 g n such that Ek;2Perm n for all k 2 f 0 ; 1 g . Let RF ;n be the set of all maps R : f0; 1g f 0 ; 1 g n ! f 0 ; 1 g n .
A family of functions with key length and block length n is a map G : f0; 1g f 0 ; 1 g n ! f 0 ; 1 g n , that is, G 2 RF ;n . Each -bit key k speci es the map G k def = Gk;2Rand n . This map is not necessarily a permutation. If G k is a permutation for each k 2 f 0 ; 1 g ie., G 2 BC ;n then we call G a family of permutations, or a block cipher. We view G as a probability space over Rand n given by c hoosing functions via a uniform choice of the underlying key; that is, g G is the same as k f 0 ; 1 g ; g G k .
Given a block cipher E, the block cipher E ,1 : f0; 1g f0;1g n ! f 0 ; 1 g n is de ned by E ,1 k;y being the unique point x such that Ek;x = y . W e i n terchangeably write E ,1 k y and E ,1 k;y. An adversary is an algorithm A with access to some number of oracles. Oracles are denoted as superscripts to A, a s i n A E; E , 1 ;F . An oracle responds to its query in unit time.
Complexity theoretic model
We will have two measures of security: the strength of G as a PRF and the strength of G as a PRP. W e follow 6 in the manner in which the basic notion of 8 is concretized."
First, we need the concept of advantage, which for emphasis we call the computational advantage" and write CAdv. Let D be an algorithm a distinguisher" taking an oracle for a function g, and let G 1 ; G 2 betwo families of functions with the same block length. We de ne
Now, suppose F is a family of functions, and E is a family of permutations. We let The advantage A gains depends, in part, on the numberof queries q she asks of f and the total number of queries t she asks of E and E ,1 . We are interested in ISec prf F q;t = max A fIAdv prf F Ag ; the maximum being over all adversaries that make up toueries to the f oracle and up to t queries to the E and E ,1 oracles. This is an information-theoretic setting: the adversary has unlimited computational power.
If we think of E as a concrete block cipher, and not an idealized one, then attacks in this model correspond to attacks in which the adversary exploits no characteristics speci c to the block cipher, only generic" features of the construction F we are analyzing. Thus, security guarantees from results in this model are weaker than those from results in the model above, yet they do have some meaning. We use the Shannon model when technical di culties prevent us from getting bounds as good as we w ould like in the complexity theoretic model. Note. The goal will be to upper bound ISec prf F q;tas a function of t; q; ; n. As such w e don't really need any notion of ISec prp ;n q;t, the security of the block cipher, because the latter is assumed ideal, but there are two reasons to de ne it anyway. First, to maintain a uniform security treatment across the models, and in particular be consistent with Section 2; second, because it is indeed the quantity with which w e wish to compare ISec prf F q;t.
We de ne ISec prp ;n q;t as the maximum, over all adversaries A of the speci ed resources, of the Notice that this quantity is not zero. For q 1 and large n we w ould expect it to be about t 2 , , corresponding to an exhaustive k ey search attack.
Security of the Fn Construction
We summarize both proven security guarantees and attacks that indicate the tightness of the bounds in them.
Security in the complexity theoretic model
Here we refer to the notions of security of Section 4.1. We assume E is a PRP family and show our construction is a PRF family, via a reduction. We do this only for the case where the key length,
, is identical to the block length, n, and we drop no bits, namely d = 0 .
Theorem 5.1 Let = n be a positive i n teger and let E: f0; 1g f 0 ; 1 g n ! f 0 ; 1 g n beafamily of permutations whose security as a PRP family is described by security function CSec prp E ; . Let F: f0; 1g f 0 ; 1 g n ! f 0 ; 1 g n be our construction for the case of no bit dropping, namely F = Fn 0 E. Its security as a PRF is described by function CSec prf F ; which for any numberof queries q 2 n =2 and time t can be bounded as follows: So these bounds are not proof that the security o f F goes beyond the birthday bound. It would benice to improve the above result. However, even the proof of the above is not exactly trivial, and this is one reason we include the result in this paper: we hope its ideas are food for thought towards an extension. As far as we can tell, the di culties in extending the above result are techncial rather than arising from any weakness in the construction. We could bewrong. Is there any other way we can give some meaningful evidence of the strength of the construction? We do this by analyzing it in the Shannon model.
Security in the ideal block cipher model
The theorem below looks at the most general version of the F = Fn d E construction, when the numberdof bits dropped is arbitrary and no restrictions are made on ; n, in the model of Section 4.2, where E is an ideal cipher. We obtain very strong results, showing security not only beyond the birthday bound, but nearly as good as one could hope for.
As we noted in Section 2, an important mode of operation for our construction will be when the values to which F Proof: See Section 7.
The rst term bounding IAdv prf F A remains low until q 2 4=5 or t 2 4=5 . We speculate that these conditions can be further improved to 2 1, and they are already very small in their current form, so a reasonable summary of IAdv prf F A i s t o s a y that the construction is good until q minf2 ; 2 n,d g or t minf2 ; 2 n+=2 g.
In Figure 1 we illustrate our bound for the case of a block cipher with parameters n = 64, = 128, and dropping d = 8 bits. The bound indicates that one must ask about 2 55 queries before one can hope to distinguish F k from a random function with advantage 1=e. This 1=e-convention is a convenient way to summarize security. For comparison, if you let F = E you get the usual birthday-attack curve, which indicates that it takes but 2 32 queries before an adversary can get like advantage at distinguishing E k from a random function. It is important t o understand the di erence between the results here and those of Section 5.1. The type" of security guarantee is better in the latter, since we are saying that security in the sense of a PRP using the standard notion of a PRP translates into security in the sense of a PRF using the standard notion of a PRF. The results here are only about ideal ciphers, which only guarantees security against generic attacks. Yet, generic attacks are an important and easy to mount class of attacks, and a proof of security against them, especially with such strong bounds, is certainly meaningful. Eventually we hope strong results will emerge in the other model as well as for other PRP-to-PRF constructions.
Attacks Lower bounds
In Propositions 5.3 and 5.4 we present the best attacks that we know on our construction. These translate into lower bounds on the security of Fn d E. We present two adversaries: one which becomes successful when q 2 n,d , and one which becomes successful when t 2 . This is done in the Shannon model, but in this case of attacks this is not a restriction; if we can attack ideal ciphers we can certainly attack real ones. Thus, the results here should be viewed as complementing Theorem 5.2, telling us how close to tight is the analysis in the latter. Proposition 5.3 Let n; be positive i n tegers and d; q non-negative i n tegers with 0 d n , and let F = Fn d . Then there is an adversary CS which asks at mostueries of an f oracle, no queries of the E or E ,1 oracles, and achieves advantage The rst lower bound is around 1 ,e ,q2 d,n,1 , while the second one is around t2 ,j .These become signi cant when q 2 n,d or t 2 j .The point of giving these lower bounds is to see how tight i s Theorem 5.2. As Figure 3 illustrates, the bounds are quite close for realistic parameters. On the same plot we graph our upper and lower bound for = 56, n = 64, and d = 7 . The curves almost coincide. 6 Proof of Theorem 5.1
Refer to Section 5.1 for the theorem statement and to Section 4.1 for the de nitions of security. We n o w provide the proof.
Since the oracles we provide our adversaries are deterministic, we assume throughout and without loss of generality that no adversary ever repeats an oracle query. By Time E we mean the worst-case amount of time required to calculate function E in our underlying xed model of computation.
We use the notion of multi-oracles as in 3 , to provide a framework in which t o reason about intermediate constructions that arise in our analysis. A multi-oracle is simply a sequence of oracles, with some rules as to how queries to the multi-oracle are answered by the individual oracles.
In our setting, an adversary makingueries will be provided with a multi-oracle consisting of q functions, f 1 ; : : : ; f q , each mapping n bits to n bits. The adversary's j-th query to the multi-oracle will be answered by f j , for j = 1 ; : : : ; q . That is, if the j-th query to is x j then the response is f j x j . Note that in this game it is not possible to ask two queries of a single oracle, nor to ask queries in some di erent order: the adversary is e ectively restricted to sequentially querying f 1 ; : : : ; f q in that order, with exactly one query to each function. Furthermore, all queries x 1 ; : : : ; x q are distinct strings.
We will consider various possible multi-oracles. The rst, represented pictorially, i s 0 : E E k E E k ; where k f 0 ; 1 g is a random key and there is a total of q instances of E E k above. Next come two classes, or types, of multi-oracles, and in each type there are q + 1 di erent m ulti-oracles, so that we have s; i for i = 0 ; : : : ; q and s = 1 ; 2. We typically want to visualize and compare the i-th members of each class. These are represented pictorially below. In each case i+1 ; : : : ; q P erm n are randomly and independently chosen permutations, and k 1 ; : : : ; k i , 1 In other words, in 1; i , the i-th oracle is encryption under a key k i distinct from those of the previous oracles. In 2; i the i-th oracle is a random permutation independent o f a n ything else.
Observe that 1; i = 2; i , 1 for i = 1; : : : ; q ; this is something we will use later. Now, for be the probability that A outputs 1 in the game where it is provided with the corresponding multioracle, the probability being over the choice of the multi-oracle as discussed above, and over the coins of A, i f a n y . W e n o w claim that !0 = Pr k f 0 ; 1 g ; g E E k : A g = 1 ! 1; 0 = Pr g Rand n : A g = 1 :
The rst equality follows from the de nition of 0. For the second, observe that 1; 0 consists of q random, independent permutations, 1 ; : : : ; q . The adversary is making exactly one query to each of these, so the responses are independently and uniformly distributed over f0; 1g n . Thus the equality is true.
Thus our goal is to bound !0 , !1; 0. We will do so by comparing both to !1; q . The proofs of the following lemmas appear later. And then apply the two lemmas above to obtain the bound in the theorem. So to complete the proof of the theorem we need to prove the two lemmas. The rst is quite straightforward; the second will take w ork.
Proof of Lemma 6.1: We bound the quantity in question via the advantage of a distinguisher D for E versus Perm n that we will construct below. It gets an oracle for a function g which is either E k for a random k or is Perm n and wants to tell which. It uses A as a subroutine and will respond to oracle queries in such a way that A is working with multi-oracle E g ; E g ; : : : ; E g . D for E versus Perm n that we will construct below. It gets an oracle for a function g which is either E k for a random k or is Perm n and wants to tell which. It uses A as a subroutine.
Before specifying the code and analysis let us try to give an idea of the issues.
D will try to respond to oracle queries of A in such a w a y that A is working with multi-oracle
where k 1 ; : : : ; k i , 1 are random but distinct keys, and i+1 ; : : : ; q are random, independent permutations. D can simulate" the rst k , 1 oracles by c hoosing random but distinct keys k 1 ; : : : ; k i , 1 and responding to a query to the j-th oracle j = 1 ; : : : ; i , 1 via E k j . Simulation of the i+1-th to q-th oracles is even easier: since each is called exactly once, D can just return a random number in response to each query. Now, we w ould like that if g E k for a random k then the oracle provide to A in the simulation looks like 1; i , and if g for a random permutation then it looks like 2; i . However, neither of these wishes is easily realizable. Consider the rst, namely the case where g = E k for a random k. For the oracle provided to A in the simulation to be 1; i i t m ust be that k 6 2 fk 1 ; : : : ; k i , 1 g . Although this happens with some probability, namely 1 , i , 1=2 , D does not know whether or not this happens. And we can't just neglect this, because then it turns out the bound would not be of good quality. Therefore the idea is to have D try to gure this out:
it will run a certain test whose purpose is to accept if k 2 f k 1 ; : : : ; k i , 1 g and reject otherwise. The test is to compute g on m values, where m is some parameter whose value in uences the analysis, and compare this to E k j evaluated on the same values, for j = 1; : : : ; i , 1. Now the problem is that this test might accept even though k is not in fact one of k 1 ; : : : ; k i , 1 , and the analysis must take that into account.
Let us now specify the code. We will then give the analysis. Below, m 0 i s a n i n teger parameter whose value we will specify later and hli is the n-bit binary representation of integer l. Algorithm W e n o w claim a certain lower bound on 1 which will be justi ed below:
The second inequality is just arithmetic, but we d o h a v e to justify the rst. In particular, it would appear that we h a v e not accounted for the equality test at all, but in fact we h a v e. with an equality, not an inequality. But some test may succeed. In fact for any key k 6 2 fk 1 ; : : : ; k i , 1 g there is a certain probability pk that the test succeeds, and this means that each key reaches the simulation part of the code with a di erent probability. However, the key observation is that if the test succeeds in these bad cases, D will output 1. So the overall probability of outputting one cannot decrease relative t o the case where the tests do not succeed, so what we h a v e written is indeed a lower bound. Now, we upper bound 0 as follows: is justi ed by observing that the chance of an equality test for a particular key k j succeeding when g is a random permutation is at most the product above, and there are i , 1 k eys tested. On the other hand, the probability of reaching the simulation is certainly only decreased, so the probability o f D outputting 1 via A can't exceed !2; i . To get Equation 5 we are rst using the observation made above that 2; i is just 1; i , 1. On the other hand we are simplifying the second term, using our assumption that q 2 n,1 .
We can now l o w er bound the di erence namely the advantage of D:
CAdv This completes the proof of Lemma 6.2.
Proof of Theorem 5.2
Refer to Section 5.1 for the theorem statement. We n o w provide the proof. Since the oracles we provide our adversaries are deterministic, we assume throughout and without loss of generality that no adversary ever repeats an oracle query. Sometimes we regard a block cipher as a two-dimensional table with 2 rows and 2 n columns, where Ek;xis the value in the cell of the k-th row and x-th column.
Given a partial function f from a subset of f0; 1g n to a subset of f0; 1g n , we denote the domain and range of f the points where f has been de ned and the values those domain points map to by Domf and Rangef, respectively. De ne Domf = f 0 ; 1 g n , Domf and Rangef = f 0 ; 1 g n , Rangef.
When an oracle's algorithm is speci ed in pseudo-code having a Boolean variable bad i , BAD i is the event that ag bad i is set true and is the rst such bad ag to be set by the algorithm.
Lemmas
The proofs in this section use two lemmas which are independent of the rest of the section. We give them here.
The rst lemma bounds the ability o f an adversary to distinguish the output from two nearly identical programs. When we write two algorithms which simulate two oracles, we specify the algorithms to be syntactically identical for as much of their speci cation as possible. Where their speci cations diverge, a ag is set, and we bound the advantage of an adversary based on her ability to set one of these ags. See Figures 4 and 5 for examples. The basis for this approach is founded on Lemma 7.1.
The second standard lemma gives upper and lower bounds for the birthday phenomena in Lemma 7.3.
Distinguishing Nearly Identical Programs. Consider an adversary A and her oracle f, and assume A is de ned to output either 0 or 1. Say that f is set to either program P 1 or P 2 , and that the advantage A has in distinguishing which is the case is Adv A = P r 1 A = 1 , Pr 2 A = 1 . Now consider the case where P 1 and P 2 are syntactically identical except for some if-guarded instructions in P 2 which, if executed, set a boolean ag bad. Let BAD be the event i n P 2 that bad is set. Proof: Let C be the set of all in nite strings representing the coins used in the experiment. Classify the elements of C into four non-overlapping sets, C 12 , C 12 , C 1 2 and C 1 2 , where the elements of C 12 cause A P 1 = 1 A P 2 = 1, and the elements of C 12 cause A P 1 = 0 A P 2 = 1, etc. Then, Adv A = Pr C A P 1 = 1 , Pr C A P 2 = 1 = j C 12 j + jC 1 Note that if an adversary is restricted to referring to no more thanq common key groups, implicitly she is restricted to no more thanq2 d total queries.
Proof: To prove the bound we devise an algorithm to simulate an oracle for the adversary. Actually, there are two algorithms developed. Both are indicated in Figure 4 , the di erence being whether or not we set the ag Game2 . We call Game 1" the result of running the speci ed algorithm with the ag Game2 set to false, and we call Game 2" the result of running the speci ed algorithm with the ag Game2 set to true. The idea of these games is to simulate one of two experiments |the exact two experiments used in the de nition of Adv 1 A | and to structure these simulations so that they are identical" until this can be maintained no longer. Game 1 simulates the experiment used to de ne the second addend of the adversary's advantage. Game 2 simulates the experiment used to de ne the rst addend of the adversary's advantage. When Games 1 and 2 diverge," a ag will beset. Bounding the probability that any of the game's ags get set will serve to bound Adv 1 A .
Let p 2 = P r h E BC ;n ; k f 0 ; 1 g j ; f 2 in the context that k 1 ; : : : ; k j are random but distinct values. It is clear that each distinct set of keys k 1 ; : : : ; k j gives rise to the same distribution on derived keys: the value of the underlying key is not signi cant, it is only a name" for referring to one of the permutations. Thus we could just as well have rst choosen the derived keys from the appropriate distribution, and only then chosen the underlying keys k 1 ; : : : ; k j all of them distinct. Conducting the experiment in this way makes it clear that the chance that an underlying key and a derived key coincide given that the underlying keys are distinct is at most qj2 , , since there are at mostq derived keys out of the 2 possible ones, and whatever the derived keys are, we subsequently choose j random distinct keys and look to see if there is a collision.
Bounding BAD 3 . Let BAD be the event in Game 2 that some collection of more than 4 common key groups all map to the same k 0 value. We c hoose the number 4 to be concrete; the proof works with other numbers, but 4 yields a good result and simpli es the exposition. We bound Pr 2 BAD 3 by Pr 2 BAD 3 = Pr 2 BAD 3 jBAD Pr 2 BAD + P r 2 BAD 3 jBAD Pr 2 BAD Pr 2 BAD + P r 2 BAD 3 jBAD
We n o w bound each summand.
Bounding Pr 2 BAD . If n, then Pr 2 BAD = 0 because the rst n bits of each k 0 will be the result of a permutation on di ering group selector x 0 values, hence these values will be di erent for each common key group. In the case where n , each k 0 is generated by a single n-bit permutation, with the trailing n, bits deleted. This results in as many a s m i n 2 n,d ; 2 n, common key groups mapping to each k 0 -value. For some 5 common key groups x 0 1 ; : : : ; x 0 5 to map to the same derived key, the permuted values of x 0 1 ; : : : ; x 0 5 m ust agree in the rst bits. The probability of this is no more than 2 ,4 . The adversary is restricted toq common key groups, so given Proof: To prove the bound we devise an algorithm to simulate a triple of oracles hE;E , 1 ; F i for the adversary. Actually, there are two algorithms developed. Both are indicated in Figure 5 , the di erence being whether or not we set the ag Game3 . We call Game 3" the result of running the Figure 5 : Game 3 when Game3 = true and Game 4 otherwise. speci ed algorithm with the ag Game3 set to true, and we call Game 4" the result of running the speci ed algorithm with the ag Game3 set to false. The idea of these games is to simulate one of two experiments |the exact two experiments used in the de nition of Adv 2 A | and to structure these simulations so that they are identical" until this can be maintained no longer. Game 3 will simulate the rst experiment in the expression for Adv 2 A , that is, the experiment associated to When Games 3 and 4 diverge," a ag will be set. Bounding the probability that this ag gets set will serve to bound Adv 2 A . Games 3 and 4 were designed to make the following two claims clear: Therefore, instead of directly considering adversaries who try to maximize jp 3 ,p 4 j, w e m a y consider adversaries whose goal it is to set the bad i ags in Game 3. Claim 7.11 tells us that jp 3 , p 4 j is no larger than the maximum probability an adversary can achieve in setting the ags in Game 3. For the remainder of this section, we consider in turn the maximum probability an adversary D has in setting each of the bad i ags. The overall bound we wish to prove, jp 3 , p 4 j, is no larger than the sum of these maximum probabilities. We now bound the maximum probability that an adversary has in causing each e v ent BAD i in Game 3. Recall our convention that BAD i is the event that bad i is the rst ag to get set.
Bounding BAD 1 . The underlying keys are uniformly distributed and so we bound their collision probability with a birthday bound. So, Pr 3 BAD 1 j 2 2 ,,1 .
Bounding BAD 2 BAD 5 BAD 9 . Each common key group shares a single derived key. The elements of the common key group along with their associated derived key together de ne a contiguous set of entries in the HF- an entry in HFk; is also in HEk;, for any k. We therefore bound BAD 3 BAD 6 BAD 8 on the adversary's ability to cause such a collision in the same manner we did in the previous paragraphs.
Let BAD be the event that such a collison occurs, then Pr 3 BAD 2 BAD 5 BAD 9 Pr 3 BAD .
As in the proof of Lemma 7.4, we assume that no 4 common key groups map to the same derived key see that proof for details. Thus, we consider the case where no HFk; has more than 4 2 d de ned elements, and they are all random and distinct by de nition. Again, those entries associated witht the elements of ukey are bounded separately. So, given that q i E-oracle queries are made of the form Ei; , no matter what their distribution, the chance of colliding with at least one of the 4 2 d random distinct values from HFi; is 1 , 1 , q i =2 , 4 2 d 42 d . We sum over all q i . The sum is maximized when q i = q for a single value of i. Adding the term which compensates for our assumption that no 4 common key groups map to the same derived key, and we arrive at our bound, 1 , 1 , q=2 , 4 Furthermore, The value of each underlying key is not signi cant, it is only a name" for referring to one of the permutations. j2 , .
The summation of these terms completes the bound of Lemma 7.8.
By the triangle inequality, Adv A Adv 1 A + Adv 2 A , which concludes the proof of Theorem 5.2. Remark 7.12 If n then we can improve our bound to:
Adv A q2 2d,n,1 + j 2 2 , + jq2 ,+1 + td=ne2 , + t2 , + tt2 d,n, : Proof: If n, then Pr 1 BAD 1 q2 2d,n,1 and Pr 3 BAD 4 + P r 3 BAD 7 tt2 d,n, . Each common key group will be mapped to a di erent derived key k 0 . When n, the keys are generated by a function which is the concatenation of j 1 permutations, ensuring than no two inputs map to the same output.
Analysis of attacks
Here we prove the lower bounds, namely the results of Section 5.3.
Proof of Proposition 5.3
Adversary CS looks for collisions within common key groups in the output of f. The attacks are speci ed in Figure 6 . Figure 6 : Naive attacks. Left: collision-search adversary. Right: key-search adversary.
Pr Rand n : CS = 1 . This is easily bounded using Lemma 7.3. Let Q = bq2 ,d c. Proof: If f is a random function then there is a small chance that KS will incorrectly identify it as an instance of Fn d E. For this to happen some k 1 ; : : : ; k j m ust collide with f's output. This occurs with chance only 2 ,nc for each o f t h e t queries, and so Pr h E BC ;n ; f Rand n : KS f;E t; d; j; c = 1 i is no more than t2 ,nc . If f is an instance of Fn d E, then the chance that the algorithm outputs 1 is at least as much as the probability that the algorithm guesses the random key set correctly. We try minfbt=cj +1c; 2 j g out of a total 2 j possible keys, from which the result now follows.
